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NOTES
1985 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
ACT: LEAVING ATOMIC VETERANS AT
GROUND ZERO
INTRODUCTION
As part of the atomic-weapons testing and development program,
the United States Government, between 1945 and 1962, conducted 693
announced nuclear tests, 212 of which were conducted in the atmos-
phere.' In 1951, the Department of Defense began troop maneuvers
in conjunction with many of these tests, in order to determine the
effects of above-ground nuclear explosions on military personnel.2 Over
220,000 members of the armed forces subsequently participated in the
testing of nuclear devices.' As a result of their participation, military
personnel were exposed to varying levels of radiation because of their
proximity to ground zero during and after the detonation of atomic
bombs.' A significant number of these former service members now
1. S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 374 (1984).
2. See H. ROSENBERG, ATOMIC SOLDIERS 24-25 (1980). The troop maneuvers
were intended to serve dual purposes. First, soldiers would be better prepared to
fight on nuclear battlefields in the future. Second, the psychological reaction of the
participating troops and any subsequent deterioration in their combat performance
could be studied. Note, Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran: Shifting the Burden
of Proof on Factual Causation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 933, 934 (1981).
3. H.R. REP. No. 592, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984).
4. At some tests, troops were positioned near detonation sites. At other tests,
units were marched to the center of the explosion shortly after detonation and run
through simulated combat maneuvers. Veterans Exposure to Ionizing Radiation as a
Result of Detonations of Nuclear Devices: Hearing Before the Comm. on Veterans' Af-
fairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983) (statement of Senator Arlen Specter) thereinafter
cited as 1983 Hearings]; see also Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 714 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) (plaintiff ordered to stand in open field near ground
zero to witness nuclear bomb detonation); Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277,
278 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (plaintiffs decedent ordered to walk to ground zero after observ-
ing nuclear explosion); Fountain v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 698, 700 (W.D. Ark.
1981) (plaintiff ordered to crouch in a field 3500 yards from where atomic bomb was
exploded and then ordered to march as close to the center of the explosion as possi-
ble). See also Note, supra note 2, at 935-36 (describing troop exercises at the Nevada
Test Site, where the majority of atmospheric nuclear tests took place).
No special protective clothing was worn by troops participating in the atomic-
testing program. Note, supra note 2, at 951. Radioactive dust, stirred up by troop
advancement, helicopters, and other military vehicles, was easily inhaled and ingested
by the soldiers. Id. The primary means of decontamination was the sweeping of per-
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suffer from leukemia or cancer of the thyroid, lung, liver, skin and
bone marrow and often produce children with severe congenital defects
as well as mental retardation.'
Some of the irradiated veterans, asserting that their illnesses
are traceable to the atomic-testing program, have brought claims
against the United States Government, seeking monetary damages.'
These claims have consistently been denied, however, on the basis
of a doctrine first pronounced by the Supreme Court in Feres v. United
States,7 which effectively created intramilitary immunity for incident-to-
service injuries The Feres doctrine has remained an insurmountable
obstacle to irradiated veterans' suits against the government and its
officials, despite the legal theory employed.' Atomic veterans have
been equally unsuccessful in seeking redress from the Veterans' Ad-
ministration because of their inability to establish a causal connec-
tion between their illnesses and the atomic-testing program.'"
Unable to circumvent the broadly-scoped Feres doctrine or to
recover disability benefits from the Veterans' Administration, atomic
veterans have recently begun suing the operators of research institu-
tions that participated in the atomic-weapons testing program." This
sonnel with brooms in order to remove contaminated dust. Id. See also Fountain, 533
F. Supp. at 700.
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the government knew of the dangers
involved. Since 1902, when cancer was first attributed to overexposure to x-rays, the
health hazards of exposure to radiation were known. See H.R. REP. No. 592, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1984). Although for many years medical scientists assumed there were
no adverse effects from low levels of exposure, in the 1940's and 1950's the medical
community realized that there was no safe "threshold," that even low levels of ex-
posure carried a degree of risk which increased linearly with dosage. 1983 Hearings.
supra note 4, at 98 (fact sheet prepared by Defense Nuclear Agency).
5. See, e.g., Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125, 126 (9th Cir. 1981) (radiation-
related cancer, genetic damage); Hinkie, 524 F. Supp. at 279- (radiation-related
chromosomal damage, birth defects such as lack of thumb joints, lack of esophagus,
mental retardation); Fountain, 533 F. Supp. at 700 (radiation-related leukemia).
6. See infra notes 74-106 and accompanying text.
7. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
8. See infra notes 48-73 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 74-137 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
11. An estimated 100 veterans' suits, filed in several states, are currently
pending against companies and research facilities that participated in the testing pro-
gram. Nat'l Law Journal, Nov. 12, 1984, at 26, col. 1. Such organizations were placed
under government contract at the inception of the nuclear-weapons testing program
in order to provide scientific, engineering, and technical support in the development
of nuclear energy. S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 375 (1984). Veterans' suits
currently pending against the contractors allege numerous causes of action including
human experimentation, civil conspiracy, fraudulent concealment, violation of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights, and negligence. See, e.g., In re Consolidated United States
Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 616 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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final avenue of redress has effectively been foreclosed, however, by
the 1985 Department of Defense Authorization Act. The Act pro-
vides that all pending and future charges brought against contrac-
tors involved in the atomic-testing program will now be converted
into suits against the federal government, thereby invoking the Feres
bar to recovery.3
This note will examine the overall impact of the 1985 Defense
Authorization Act on atomic veterans' suits and will conclude that
the new law effectively renders the irradiated veteran remediless."4
Additionally, this note will raise several constitutional objections to
the new legislation. First, it will be argued that the new law, by ex-
tinguishing accrued causes of action, in -which there is a recognized
property right, effects a "taking" under the fifth amendment for which
compensation must be paid. 5 Secondly, it will be argued that the pro-
visions of the 1985 Defense Authorization Act fail to comport with
the right to due process guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS EXCLUSIVE DEFENDANT:
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The 1985 Department of Defense Authorization Act, a $212 billion
military appropriations bill, was signed into law on October 19, 1984.17
Section 1631 of the Act limits private contractors' liability for injuries
arising out of the atomic-testing program. I" Although this five-
12. Pub. L. No. 98-525, S 1631, 98 Stat. 2492, 2647-48 (1984). Section 1631 has
been codified at 42 U.S.C. S 2212 (1985).
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 74-146 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 147-82 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 183-212 and accompanying text.
17. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525, 98
Stat. 2492 (1984). An 11th hour bill, the new law was hurriedly passed by Congress
before the election recess.
18. Section 1631 provides, in relevant part:
(a)(1) The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b)
and 2672 of title 28, United States Code, or by the Act of March 9, 1920
(46 U.S.C. 742-752 and 781-790), as appropriate, for injury, loss of property,
personal injury, or death shall apply to any civil action for injury, loss
of property, personal injury, or death due to exposure to radiation based
on the acts or omissions by a contractor in carrying out an atomic weapons
testing program under a contract with the United States.
(2) The remedies referred to in paragraph (1) shall be exclusive of any
other civil action or proceeding for the purpose of determining civil liability
arising from any act or omission of the contractor without regard to when
the act or omission occurred. The employees of a contractor referred to
in paragraph (1) shall be considered to be employees of the Federal Govern-
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paragraph provision was greatly overshadowed by controversial
defense issues such as MX missile procurement,19 its impact on suits
brought by atomic veterans is profound.
The effect of section 1631 is two-fold. Initially, the new law con-
verts all pending and future actions brought against private contrac-
tors for injuries incident to the atomic-testing program into suits
ment, as provided in section 2671 of title 28, United States Code, for the
purposes of any such civil action or proceeding, and the civil action or
proceeding shall proceed in .the same manner as any action against the
United States filed pursuant to section 1346(b) of such title and shall be
subject to the limitations and exceptions applicable to those actions.
(b) A contractor against whom a civil action or proceeding described in
section (a) is brought shall promptly deliver all processes served upon
that contractor to the Attorney General of the United States. Upon cer-
tification by the Attorney General that the suit against the contractor
is within the provisions of subsection (a), a civil action or proceeding com-
menced in a State court shall be removed without bond at any time before
trial by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending
and the proceedings shall be deemed a tort action brought against the
-United States under the provisions of section 1346(b), 2401(b), or 2402,
of sections 2671 through 2680 of title 28, United States Code ....
(c) the provisions of this section shall apply to any action now pending
or hereafter commenced which is an action within the provisions of subsec-
tion (a) of this section ....
(d) For purposes of this section, the term "contractor" includes a contrac-
tor or cost reimbursement subcontractor of any tier participating in the
conduct of the United States atomic weapons testing program for the
Department of Energy (or its predecessor agencies, including the Manhat-
tan Engineer District, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Energy
Research and Development Administration). Such term also includes
facilities which conduct or have conducted research concerning health
effects of ionizing radiation in connection with the testing under contract
with the Department of Energy (or any of its predecessor agencies).
Id., 5 1631, 98 Stat. at 2646-47. The contractor liability provision was included in the
Senate version of the bill but not in the bill approved by the House. See S. 2723,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. S 330 (1984); H.R. 5167, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). H.R. 5167
was later, however, amended to contain S. 2723 and the bill was approved by a House-
Senate subcommittee, with the atomic-testing provision intact, on Sept. 25, 1984. See
H.R. REP. No. 1080, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 162 (1984). The bill was approved by voice
vote in both houses on Sept. 27, 1984.
19. See Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525,
§ 110, 98 Stat. 2492, 2504-07 (1984). Although the 1985 Department of Defense Act
was the result of over three months of extensive hearings, the record is bereft of
discussion relating to the contractor liability provision. In fact, plaintiffs' attorneys
in pending atomic-testing cases have charged that the provision was "passed furtive-
ly." Congress Drops Bombs on Vets, Nat'l Law Journal, Nov. 12, 1984, at 24, col. 1.
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against the federal government.' The federal government is thereby
made the exclusive defendant in these atomic-testing cases. Second-
ly, the defense authorization bill mandates that all such suits be tried
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), pursuant to FTCA limita-
tions and exceptions." Accordingly, claimants will be forced to sue
in federal court' and will be denied the opportunity to seek punitive
damages.23
The legislative intent underlying section 1631, and the protec-
tion it affords atomic-testing contractors, was set forth by the Senate
Armed Services Committee in a report issued in May, 1984.4 Initial-
ly, the Committee suggested that although independent contractors
are not normally shielded from liability under the FTCA,'5 contrac-
tors involved in the atomic-testing program are "unique."" Such con-
tractors were considered atypical by the Committee on the grounds
that the government, not the contractors, had plenary control of the
atomic-testing programY As such, the contractors were mere in-
strumentalities assisting in an "entirely governmental task."' 8
The Committee -further justified extension of the FTCA's pro-
tective mantle to include atomic-testing contractors on the grounds
that the contractors were vital to the development and utilization of
atomic energy for military purposes.' The Committee noted that the
atomic-weapons testing program was, from its inception, highly depen-
dent on the scientific, engineering, and technical expertise provided
by the contractors. 0 As such, the contractors made a significant con-
20. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525, S 1631,
98 Stat. 2492, 2646-47 (1984).
21. Id. See 28 U.S.C. SS 1291, 1346(b)-(c), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2412, 2671-80
(1982).
22. See 28 U.S.C. S 1346(b) (1982).
23. See id. at S 2674.
24. See S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 374 (1984).
25. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. S 2671 (1982).
26. S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 374 (1984).
27. Id. at 374-75. The Committee emphasized that the Government alone set
the policy and controlled the activities and circumstances surrounding the atomic-testing
program. Furthermore, each nuclear test was conducted under the statutory direction
of Congress, with prior approval by the President of the United States. The atomic-
testing contractors did not set the times or places for the tests, nor did they direct
military personnel to participate in the tests. Id. at 374-76.
28. Id. at 375.
29. Id. at 376. The Committee recognized that without the participation of
these organizations, the atomic-weapons testing program could not have proceeded,
either technically or economically. Id.
30. Id.
19861
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tribution to the development of atomic energy and thus to the na-
tion's defense and security.3 ' Accordingly, the Committee felt that
abandoning the contractors to a flood of litigation arising from the
atomic-testing program would* be unjust. 2
Next, the Committee set out three factors in support of section
1631's mandate that atomic-testing suits against independent contrac-
tors be tried under the FTCA. First, the consolidation of such cases
under the FTCA would protect the United States from a variety of
judgments based on the divergencies of state laws.3 1 Secondly, the
consolidation of suits would provide a uniform remedy, where a con-
nection between the nuclear testing program and the harm alleged
was established.3 ' Thirdly, under the leadership of the Department
of Justice, the government would be afforded the best defense possible.'
In summary, section 1631 converts all atomic-testing suits against
private contractors into suits against the federal government in order
to protect the "unique" organizations which merely functioned as
governmental instrumentalities in a task vital to national security.
Additionally, section 1631 requires that all such suits be tried under
the FTCA in order that the United States may receive the best
defense possible and so that remedies, if warranted, will be uniform.
Where suits are brought by irradiated veterans, however, the "best
defense possible" will come not from the Attorney General, but from
the courts, who by broadly applying the Feres doctrine, will ensure
that remedies are uniformly nonexistent.
31. Id. As stated by Congress in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 'the develop-
ment, utilization and control of atomic energy for military and all other purposes are
vital to the common defense and security.' Id. at 375 (quoted by the Committee with
approval).
32. Id. at 377. As noted by the Committee, literally thousands of plaintiffs
to date have filed suits against the operators of government laboratories involved in
the atomic-testing program, seeking billions of dollars in damages. Id. Moreover, since
hundreds of thousands of military and civilian personnel participated in the tests,
thousands more may be expected to file law suits, Id. at 376. Legislative concern for
the private contractors over the flood of litigation is perhaps misplaced, however, since
by the Committee's own admission, the contractors are "fully indemnified by the govern-
ment under the terms of their contracts." See id. As such, the contractors would be
completely reimbursed for any liability arising out of their participation in the testing
program, including the costs of litigation. Id. at 375. Consequently, as the Committee
admitted, the ultimate burden would fall not upon the contractors, but upon the tax-
payers. Id. at 376.
33. Id. at 377.
34. Id.
35. Id.
[Vol. 20
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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS EXCLUSIVE DEFENDANT:
JUDICIAL EFFECT
The 1985 Department of Defense Act converts all pending and
future actions against contractors involved in the atomic-testing pro-
gram into suits against the federal government. 6 Additionally, the
new law directs that all such suits be tried under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) 7 An analysis of the judicial effect which the new
legislation will have on atomic veterans must accordingly begin with
the FTCA and its waiver of sovereign immunity. More critically,
however, a judicially-created exception to the waiver of sovereign im-
munity known as the Feres doctrine must be examined.
The Federal Tort Claims Act: Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),38 enacted in 1946, allows
tort actions to be brought against the federal government for injury
caused by the negligence of government employees acting within the
scope of their employment.' Prior to its enactment, the United States
was insulated from such liability under the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity."' In restricting the doctrine through the FTCA, Congress pro-
vided that the United States would be liable in those circumstances
under which a private individual would be liable under state law.'1
36. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525, S 1631,
98 Stat. 2492, 2646-47 (1984).
37. Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. SS 1291, 1346(b)-(c), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2412, 2671-80 (1982).
39. 28 U.S.C. S 1346(b) (1982).
40. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is grounded in the English common
law concept that the King could do no wrong and the derivative American belief that
the state could be sued only with its consent. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,
139 (1950). Additionally, it is suggested that "to allow recovery against the govern-
ment would threaten a raid on the federal treasury, endanger important policies and
goals, and ultimately affect the stability of the government." Comment, The Supreme
Court and the Tort Claims Act: End of an Enlightened Era, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 267,
270 (1978).
Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, relief could be sought for injuries caused
by government agents only by filing a special bill in Congress. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140.
Accordingly, the implementation of the FTCA served dual purposes. Initially, it relieved
Congress of the cumbersome and inefficient task of reviewing these private bills of
relief. See id.; Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953). Secondly, it provided
"much-needed relief to those suffering injury from the negligence of government
employees." United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 165-66 (1963). As such, the FTCA
mitigated the harsh and often unjust consequences of sovereign immunity. Feres, 340
U.S. at 139 (1950).
41. See 28 U.S.C. S 2674 (1982) ("United States shall be liable ... in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.").
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Congress did, however, limit this broad waiver of sovereign immunity
by excluding liability for punitive damages'2 and by delineating special
exceptions to the government's general consent to be sued. 3
Two such special exceptions are pertinent to military personnel.
Service members may not bring claims against the government which
arise out of military combat activities during wartime."' Additionally,
claims arising in a foreign country are barred . 5 Notably, however,
the FTCA contains no general exception barring all tort claims brought
by service members." Moreover, the FTCA does not bar intramilitary
tort claims. 7
Claims brought by members of the armed forces are therefore
not expressly thwarted by the FTCA. Instead, such claims have been
frustrated by the judiciary, which soon after the enactment of the
FTCA carved out a further exception to the government's waiver of
sovereign immunity, creating intramilitary immunity for claims of
negligence brought under the FTCA.
The Feres Doctrine: Reinstatement of Sovereign Immunity for
Intramilitary Claims
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether in-
tramilitary claims could be brought under the FTCA in Brooks v.
United States8 and, a year later, in Feres v. United States.9 In both
cases, the Court acknowledged that the FTCA did not expressly ex-
clude claims brought by one member of the armed services against
42. Id.
43. Thirteen special exceptions have been carved out by Congress. See 28 U.S.C.
S 2680(a)-(f), (h)-(m) (1982).
44. Id. at S 2680(j).
45. Id. at S 2680(k).
46. Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, the majority of tort claims bills in-
troduced into Congress did contain provisions denying recovery to members of the
armed forces. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1948). Noting that Congress,
in enacting the FTCA, chose not to include such provisions and further noting the
specificity of the exceptions Congress did enumerate, the Brooks Court concluded that
"it would be absurd" to believe that Congress intended to mandate a blanket exclusion
of military claims. Id. at 51-52.
47. Government officials or employees upon whose negligence a cause of ac-
tion may be based, include, by definition, "members of the military or naval forces
of the United States ... acting in the line of duty." 28 U.S.C. S 2671 (1982). Accordingly,
it is contemplated within the FTCA that a wrongfully injured service member may
bring a cause of action based on the negligence of a fellow military member or official.
48. 337 U.S. 49 (1949). A service member was injured while on furlough in an
off-base collision with an Army truck. Id. at 50.
49. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
[Vol. 20
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another.' However, although an injured serviceman was allowed to
bring an FTCA action in Brooks," the Court emphasized that the ac-
cident was unrelated to the plaintiff's military service and declined
to address the issue of whether an incident-to-service injury would
be actionable.5" This issue Was settled a year later in Feres, wherein
the Court held that the government is not liable under the FTCA
for injuries to service members "when the injuries arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service. '"'
The Supreme Court in Feres based its broad holding which
barred FTCA claims for in-service torts on three basic factors. In-
itially, the Court justified its holding by referring to the FTCA
prescription that the government shall be liable "in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like cir-
cumstances."' The Court found that because no American law had
ever permitted a member of the armed forces to recover for the
negligence of either a superior officer or the government, there was
no parallel liability in an individual.5 5 Moreover, the Court reasoned
that no analogous liability existed "under like circumstances" because
no private individual can "conscript or mobilize a private army."'
A second reason for the in-service exception offered by the Court
was that the FTCA's application of state law to service members'
tort actions would be inconsistent with the "distinctively federal"
character of the relationship between the government and military
personnel.' The Court expressed concern that under the FTCA, a serv-
ice member's recovery would depend on the geographical fortuity of
50. Id. at 138-39.
51. 337 U.S. at 54.
52. The Court noted that "[wiere the accident incident to Brooks' service, a
wholly different case would be presented. We express no opinion as to it." Id. at 52.
In so stating, the Court set the stage for the Feres holding.
53. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. Feres is actually a compilation of three cases. In
the first, the plaintiff's decedent died in a fire which resulted from a defective heating
system in his barracks. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949). In the
second, the plaintiff alleged that a towel 30 inches long by 18 inches wide, marked
"Medical Department U.S. Army," was negligently left in his abdomen during an opera-
tion which he underwent while in the Army. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518
(4th Cir. 1949). The third suit also related to medical malpractice by army surgeons.
Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1949). In consolidating the cases, the
Court noted the common underlying factor in each case was that "each claimant, while
on active duty and not on furlough, sustained injury due to the negligence of others
in the armed forces." Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
54. Id. at 141. See also 28 U.S.C. S 2674 (1982).
55. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 143.
1986]
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a particular duty assignment.' Since service members on active duty
have no control over their assignments, the Court felt that protec-
tion from the divergencies of state tort law was needed. 9
Lastly, the Court reasoned that the existence of an alternative
compensatory scheme, under the Veterans' Benefits Act," justified
disallowing federal tort claims resulting from activities incident to
military service.' The Court noted that veterans' benefits require no
litigation and are not "negligible or niggardly." 2 Additionally, the
Court felt that if Congress had intended the FTCA to apply to in-
service torts, it undoubtedly would have provided for an adjustment
of veterans' benefits and other military compensation schemes with
any tort recovery.63
While the cogency of the rationales offered in the Feres opinion
has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court and
lower court decisions,6 a more compelling "military discipline" rationale
emerged in United States v. Broum6 in 1954, and has since been in-
corporated as a factor to be considered in disallowing military tort
claims. In Brown, the Court explained that the Feres exception to
the FTCA was based on the unique relationship of the soldier to his.
superiors, the potential effect of such suits on military discipline, and
the "extreme results" that might ensue from judicial review of
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed by military per-
sonnel. 7 This military discipline argument has since become the
primary justification for the Feres doctrine 8 and has served as the
58. Id.
59. See id. at 142-43.
60. See Compensation for Service-Connected Disabilities or Death, 38 U.S.C.
S 301-62 (1982).
61. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
62. Id. at 145.
63. Id. at 144.
64. See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 67 (1955) (Court
concluded Congress did not intend to predicate the government's FTCA liability on
a "completely fortuitous circumstance-the presence or absence of identical private
liability."); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963) (Court conceded that rela-
tionship of federal prisoners to national government is federal in nature like that of
soldiers and officers, but nonetheless allowed federal prisoner to sue under the FTCA
for injuries sustained during confinement in federal penitentiary); Hunt v. United States,
636 F.2d 580, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[Ilt cannot be said that the presence of an alter-
native compensation system either explains or justifies the Feres doctrine, it only makes
the effect of the doctrine more palatable.").
65. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
66. See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1973).
67. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
68. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2365 (1983); Hunt, 636 F.2d at 599
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basis for denying a widp range of service members' suits,9 including
those based on radiation-induced injuries."
While the Feres doctrine has been widely criticized in the past
three decades,7' "it is beyond question that it is the law."7 The doc-
trine's validity continues to be reaffirmed by the Supreme Court.3
Accordingly, the 1985 Defense Act will, by converting all atomic-
("IThe protection of military discipline ... serves largely if not exclusively as the
predicate for the Feres doctrine.").
69. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3524 (1985) (national guardsman injured in "mock lynching" that occurred
during training exercises); Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1981) (en
banc) (off-duty serviceman electrocuted when ladder he was working with came in con-
tact with uninsulated wire on military base); Veilette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505
(9th Cir. 1980) (service member died as a result of the alleged negligence of naval
hospital personnel); Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1979) (Air Force
sergeant injured when his car was struck head on by vehicle driven on wrong side
of road by motorist who had been sold intoxicating beverages at air force base club);
Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (service member suffered
severe mental illness allegedly as a result of participation in "Operation Third Chance,"
a covert military program designed to test the usefulness of LSD as an aid to inter-
rogation); James v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 1381 (D.R.I. 1973) (serviceman fatally
beaten by naval security guard following arrest for causing a public disturbance); Cof-
fey v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D. Cal. 1971), affd per curiam, 455 F.2d
1380 (9th Cir. 1972) (marine injured in collision with railroad switch engine on military
base, allegedly because of military's failure to properly mark railroad crossing).
70. See, e.g., Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981); Monaco
v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); Hinkie
v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Kelly v. United States, 512 F. Supp.
356 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Lombard v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 918 (D.D.C. 1981), afj'd,
690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983); Everett v. United States,
492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
71. See Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 269 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1210 (1983) (that Feres barred recovery, even assuming the plaintiffs could prove
their case, labelled "troubling"); Monaco, 661 F.2d at 132 ("The Feres doctrine today
stands on shaky ground with its precise justification confused."); James v. United States,
358 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.R.I. 1973) ("I hold that the Feres doctrine bars recovery
under the Federal Tort Claims Act in this case. This holding gives me little pleasure.
An injustice has been done in this case and it ought to be remedied."). See also Note,
Denial of Atomic Veterans' Tort Claims: The Enduring Fallout from Feres v. United
States, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259 (1982); Comment, Expansion of the Feres Doctrine,
32 EMORY L.J. 237 (1981); Comment, The Nevada Proving Grounds: An Asylum for
Sovereign Immunity?, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 627 (1981); Comment, Government Liability for
Nuclear Testing Under the Federal Tort Claims Act-Atomic Tests and the Feres Doc-
trine, 32 U. KAN. L. REv. 433 (1984).
72. Laswel, 683 F.2d at 265. See also Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580,
589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[Tlhe Feres doctrine clearly lives, although its theoretical bases
remain subject to serious doubt.").
73. United States v. Shearer, 105 S. Ct. 3039 (1980).
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testing suits against private contractors into suits against the Govern-
ment and thereby bringing the Feres doctrine into play, effectively
preclude any recovery by veterans for radiation-induced, incident-to-
service injuries. Alternative avenues of relief will likewise be lacking.
LACK OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF RELIEF
By invoking the Feres doctrine, the 1985 Defense Authorization
Act extinguishes the possibility of veterans' gaining judicial relief
through suits against atomic-testing contractors. The new law's
ultimate impact on atomic veteran recovery will therefore depend on
the availability of alternative sources of relief. Accordingly, the pros-
pects of veterans' finding judicial relief by circumventing the Feres
doctrine will be analyzed. Also, the likelihood of veterans' gaining ad-
ministrative relief through the veterans' benefits scheme will be
reviewed.
Suits Based on an Intentional Tort Theory
In an effort to circumvent the harsh impact of the Feres doc-
trine, atomic veterans have brought claims alleging that the govern-
ment knowingly, deliberately, and recklessly disregarded the soldiers'
safety by compelling them to participate in the testing of nuclear
devices."' While the Feres ruling addressed only the government's
liability for negligent torts, the judiciary has uniformly extended the
Feres bar to suits alleging intentional torts as well." The courts'
universal rejection of the intentional tort theory has been predicated
upon the belief that the considerations underlying the Feres doctrine"
apply "with equal vigor" to claims alleging intentional torts."
Most notable among these considerations are the need for main-
taining military discipline and the need for avoiding judicial review
74. See, e.g., Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981); Jaffee v.
United States, 468 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.J. 1979), affd, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (Jaffee
I); Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
75. Id. Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether
intentional torts constitute an exception to the Feres rule, every court which has con-
sidered the proposition has rejected it. Jaffee H, 468 F. Supp. at 634.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 54-63.
77. See, e.g., Everett, 492 F. Supp. at 321 (claim barred by Feres although plain-
tiff alleged that maneuvers which required her decedent to march through a nuclear
blast area less than one hour after detonation of a nuclear device constituted "human
experimentation"). See also Broudy, 661 F.2d at 127 n.4 (although plaintiff characterized
the government's nuclear-testing activities as "unconsented-to experimentations," claim
barred because "[t]he Feres doctrine does not distinguish between claims based on
the alleged level of culpability of the tortfeasor, whether a negligent, a reckless, or
even an intentional tort is alleged.").
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of military orders. 8 As noted in Jaffee v. United States (Jaffee 1)," if
intramilitary claims were subjected to judicial scrutiny, the courts
would be required to examine and rule upon the propriety of military
decisions.0 The security and common defense of the country might
quickly "disintegrate under such meddling."8' On this basis, the ir-
radiated plaintiff in Jaffee was denied recovery although he alleged
that governmental agencies "intentionally and with full knowledge of
the consequences of their actions, compelled thousands of soldiers to
march into a nuclear explosion."8 In barring the claim, the court
reasoned that litigation over intentional torts would disrupt military
discipline and undermine military decision-making to the same degree
that suits alleging negligence would.83 Moreover, the court cautioned
that if recovery was contingent upon whether the complained-of act
was negligent or intentional, recovery could be ensured merely
through "scholastic exercises in pleading.""
In ruling that claims based on an intentional tort theory fall
within the purview of the Feres doctrine, the judiciary has effective-
ly created intramilitary immunity for incident-to-service conduct, no
matter how egregious.85 By extending the Feres bar to intentional
78. Jaffee 1I, 468 F. Supp. at 634-35.
79. 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
80. Id. at 717.
81. Id.
82. Jaffee II, 468 F. Supp. at 633.
83. Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1235 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982) (Jaffee II1). In fact, the court inferred that litigation involv-
ing intentional torts might have an even greater deleterious effect because often such
a claim would turn on the exercise of discretionary military judgment. Id.
84. Id.
85. In a strongly worded dissent, the Jaffee III result was denounced as "radical
totalitarianism." Jaffee III, 663 F.2d at 1250 (Gibbons, Sloviter, JJ., dissenting). The
dissent charged that "[tihe real but unarticulated reason for the result is that the
availability of a private remedy for intentional torts will encourage public accountability
of the military, while foreclosing such a remedy will encourage concealment (the coverup
principle)." Id.
In an eloquent passage, Judge Gibbons observed:
The Twentieth Century has witnessed time and again, in this country
and elsewhere, the fragility of those protections which the legal order
affords against human rights violations. One of those fragile protections
is the admonitory law of intentional torts, designed to require public ac-
countability for individual conduct, official or private, going beyond the
bounds of social acceptability. Certainly the conduct charged in the com-
plaint, if proved, transgressed those bounds. Indeed the complaint alleges
conduct which would violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Geneva Con-
vention, the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being Sub-
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torts, the courts set up a further obstacle to veterans seeking recovery
for radiation-induced injuries, thus compelling the atomic veterans to
employ alternate theories of relief.
Suits Alleging Constitutional Violations
Atomic veterans have also attempted to avoid the broad-based
Feres doctrine by alleging intentional violations of their constitutional
rights. 6 Although the Feres ruling addressed only common law
negligence actions, this seemingly inherent limitation has not
prevented the courts from extending the Feres obstacle to constitu-
tional claims as well.87
The judicial disposition of constitutional claims is best typified
by the ruling in Jaffee v. United States (Jaffee III).88 In Jaffee III, the
plaintiff alleged that he and other soldiers were ordered "to stand
in a field without benefit of any protection while a nuclear device
was exploded a short distance away.""9 Jaffee further asserted that
the government and various United States officials, by knowingly,
deliberately, and recklessly exposing the group of soldiers to the grave
risk of injury and death, deliberately violated rights guaranteed by
the Constitution."
In determining whether a constitutional cause of action existed,
the Third Circuit initially analyzed three Supreme Court cases wherein
jected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, and the Nuremberg Code. The international consensus against
involuntary human experimentation is clear. A fortiori the conduct charged,
if it occurred, was in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United
States and of the state where it occurred or where its effects were felt.
That any judicial tribunal in the world, in the last fifth of this dismal
century, would choose to place a class of persons outside the protection
against human rights violations provided by the admonitory law of inten-
tional torts is surprising. That it should be an American court will dismay
persons the world over concerned with human rights and will embarrass
our Government.
Id. at 1249-50 (footnotes omitted). See also supra note 71.
86. See, e.g., Jaffee 111, 663 F.2d 1226; Lombard v. United States, 530 F. Supp.
918 (D.D.C. 1981), affd, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983);
Everett, 492 F. Supp. 318.
87. See Jaffee III, 663 F.2d 1226; Lombard, 530 F. Supp. 918; Everett, 492 F.
Supp. 318.
88. 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
89. Id. at 1229.
90. Id. Jaffee alleged violations of the first, fourth, fifth, eighth, and ninth
amendments. He averred that his exposure to radiation caused inoperable lymphatic
cancer, diagnosed in 1977, and breast cancer, for which he had undergone surgery. Id.
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a private right of action for constitutional violations by a federal of-
ficial had been recognized," despite the absence of any statute con-
ferring such a right.2 From these Supreme Court decisions, a two-
pronged test had emerged. Under the first prong, a constitutional
cause of action could not be implied if "Congress has provided an alter-
native remedy . . .explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective.""
Secondly, if there were "special factors counseling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress," then a constitutional cause
of action would not be warranted. 4
Applying the first prong of the test to the case at bar, the Jaffee
III court found that relief provided by the Veterans' Benefits Act
(VBA)95 was an appropriate "alternative remedy."" The court did,
however, acknowledge that Congress had not expressly declared the
VBA to be a substitute for a private right of action under the Con-
stitution in enacting the FTCA.9" Moreover, the court acknowledged
that Jaffee would not be fully compensated for his losses under the
veterans' benefits scheme." Notwithstanding these considerations, the
court found that Supreme Court interpretations of this administrative
remedy and the failure of Congress to amend the FTCA since the
Feres decision, sufficiently warranted the dismissal of Jaffee's con-
stitutional claims. 9
The court's conclusion that no constitutional cause of action ex-
isted was reinforced by consideration of the second prong of the
Supreme Court test. The court found that suits based on service in-
juries generally involve "special factors counseling hesitation."'" Citing
the Feres doctrine, the court emphasized the deleterious effects of
91. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (federal prison officials amenable to
suit under eighth amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442'U.S. 228 (1979) (direct cause
of action recognized against U.S. Congressman for sex discrimination under fifth amend-
ment); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (federal law enforcement agents sued directly under fourth amendment).
92. Jaffee III, 663 F.2d at 1230-31.
93. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19 (emphasis in original).
94. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
95. See 38 U.S.C. SS 101-5228 (1982).
96. Jaffee III, 663 F.2d at 1236.
97. Id. at 1237. Arguably, the first element of the "alternative remedy" prong
was therefore not met.
98. Id. at 1236 n.l. This factor seemingly undermines the second element
of the "alternative remedy" prong-that the substitute remedy be "equally effective."
99. Id. at 1237.
100. Id. at 1235.
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service-related suits on military performance 1 ' and accordingly cau-
tioned that judicial intervention in the area of military affairs "should
only be undertaken with care and circumspection."' °2 Thus, the court
concluded that immunity under the Feres doctrine was a "special fac-
tor" of sufficient import to preclude constitutional tort claims.' °
Although the creation of intramilitary immunity for incident-to-
service conduct which violates constitutional guarantees is arguably
an "unjust application of the Feres rule,'.. inequity has not prevented
the judiciary from universally extending the Feres bar to constitu-
tional claims."0 5 As a number of courts have stressed, it is the suit
itself and not the theory of the cause of action which implicates the
concerns underlying the Feres doctrine.' In light of this rationale,
atomic veterans have been equally unsuccessful in pleading alternative
theories of recovery.
Claims Brought Against Individual Government Officials
The Feres obstacle has been similarly insurmountable in claims
brought directly against individual military officers and government
officials.' 7 Since Feres dealt only with sovereign immunity for claims
arising from incident-to-service injuries, atomic veterans have urged
that the individual officers and officials who compelled the soldiers'
participation in the atomic-testing program should not enjoy Feres pro-
tection.' 8 This argument has been uniformly rejected by the judiciary,
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1237-38.
103. Id.
104. Jaffee H, 468 F. Supp. at 635. In dismissing Jaffee's constitutional tort
claims on the basis of Feres immunity, the court acknowledged that the application
of Feres may produce unjust results, as best illustrated by the following colloquy between
the court and the government at oral argument: "The court: [Als I read the
law, it doesn't matter if they stood up there and said 'one, two, three, left, right,
left' and marched them over a cliff . . . .You'd be protected under Feres ... ? [The
Government]: "Yes, your Honor." Id. (quoting oral argument) (ellipses in original).
105. See, e.g., Lombard, 530 F. Supp. at 923 (Feres bars constitutional tort claims
against government); Everett, 492 F. Supp. at 322 (action sounding in constitutional
tort not exempt from application of Feres doctrine).
106. See, e.g., Everett, 492 F. Supp. at 322; Thornwell v. United States, 471
F. Supp. 344, 348 (D.D.C. 1979).
107. See, e.g., Jaffee III, 663 F.2d 1226; Fountain v. United States, 533 F. Supp,
698 (W.D. Ark. 1981); Lombard, 530 F. Supp. 918 (D.D.C. 1981); Kelly v. United States,
512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
108. See, e.g., Lombard, 530 F. Supp. at 919, 922 (claim by former serviceman
who had handled radioactive materials while assigned to atomic bomb project brought
against various government officials for fraudulent concealment of risk of chromosomal
damage).
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however, on the grounds that the triad of Feres rationales"°9 is equal-
ly dispositive of claims against government officials.110
Government officials have been afforded absolute immunity
primarily because the courts have felt that suits brought against these
individuals would have a "chilling effect" on responsible military
decision-making.' As the Jaffee III court explained, military decision-
makers might not act as quickly and forcefully as necessary, if they
knew they might later be forced to explain their actions in a civilian
court. " 2 On this basis, Feres protection has uniformly been extended
to government officials and military officers, thus foreclosing another
of the atomic veterans' avenues for redress.
Claims Based on a Post-Discharge Failure to Warn Theory
A final legal theory offered by atomic veterans in attempting
to circumvent the Feres doctrine, is that the government negligently
failed to warn the veterans after their discharge from the service,
that exposure to radiation would increase the risks of contracting
cancer."3 The veterans have charged that the concealment of data link-
ing radiation exposure to cancer and the lack of follow-up medical
monitoring have greatly aggravated their radiation-related health prob-
lems.' 4 By characterizing the government's failure to warn as a post-
discharge tort, plaintiffs have attempted to avoid Feres intramilitary
immunity for "incident-to-service" tortious conduct."' As with other
legal theories employed by atomic veterans, the post-discharge failure
to warn theory offers little hope of relief.
109. See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
110. See Fountain, 533 F. Supp. at 703; Kelly, 512 F. Supp. at 361.
111. Jaffee III, 663 F.2d at 1234. The Jaffee III court emphasized that suits
against individuals would have an even greater chilling effect on military decision-
making than suits brought against the government because in the former, the person
who made the decision would be accountable for damages. Id.
112. Id. at 1232.
113. See, e.g., Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1210 (1983); Broudy, 661 F.2d 125; Gaspard v. United States, 544 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.
La. 1982), affd, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 975 (1984).
114. See, e.g., Fountain, 533 F. Supp. at 700 (veteran alleged government's
failure to warn and failure to provide adequate medical examinations prevented early
discovery of leukemia).
115. See, e.g., Broudy, 661 F.2d at 128. By alleging a post-discharge tort, veteran
plaintiffs have hoped to invoke the exception to Feres established in Brown v. United
States, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). In Brown, a former service member was allowed recovery
for the negligence of Veterans' Administration physicians in performing surgery on
the veteran's knee after his discharge. Id. at 111. The Court found that because the
surgery occurred after the plaintiffs discharge, the negligence was not "incident to
service" and therefore not barred by Feres. Id. at 111-12.
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The decisional model for claims alleging post-discharge torts was
set forth in Thornwell v. United States."' There, the plaintiff alleged
that his unconsented-to participation in a covert, army drug experimen-
tation program later caused severe mental illness." ' Thornwell fur-
ther averred that the government was negligent in failing to examine
and treat him for medical problems caused by the drug experimenta-
tion, subsequent to his release from military service."8
In allowing Thornwell's claim for a post-discharge negligent omis-
sion, the court delineated three types of personal injury cases involving
post-discharge negligence." 9 In the first type, the military commits
two separate negligent acts, one occurring prior to discharge and one
occurring after.'2' In the second type of case, a single negligent act
is committed during military service, but its effects linger after
discharge.'' In the third situation, the military commits an intentional
tort during military service and then, after discharge, negligently fails
to advise the service member of the adverse consequences that may
result from the initial wrong.'22
116. 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
117. Id. at 346.
118. Id. at 347.
119. Id. at 352.
120. Id. As examples of this type of case, the Thornwell court cited Brown,
348 U.S. 110 and Hungerford v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1961), rev'd
on other grounds, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962). In Hungerford, the plaintiff was injured
in combat and subsequently suffered blackouts. After discharge, military physicians
misdiagnosed Hungerford's condition as a psychiatric problem when, in fact, his condi-
tion resulted from an organic brain injury of traumatic origin. The court characteriz-
ed the military physician's misdiagnosis as a separate tort, not "incident-to-service,"
and accordingly not within the purview of Feres. Hungerford, 192 F. Supp. at 583-84.
121. Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. at 352. This type of case is best exemplified by
Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949) (medical malpractice during
in-service surgery caused injuries not discovered until after discharge; recovery barred),
aff'd sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
122. Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. at 352. As an example, the Thornwell court cited
Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964). In Schwartz, the plaintiff
was treated for sinusitis by army physicians while on active duty. Radioactive con-
trast dye was injected in Schwartz's sinus cavity prior to taking x-rays. After discharge,
Schwartz continued to experience pain and sought follow-up medical care from VA
clinics on numerous occasions. Each time there were symptoms of abnormality where
the dye had been injected but the VA physicians made no attempt to review Schwartz's
prior records to determine possible causes. The dye had, in fact, been proven to be
carcinogenic and was later determined to be the cause of the plaintiff's facial cancer.
The court held that once the dye was found to be dangerous, government physicians
had a duty to search past medical records and warn those who had been treated with
the dye of its dangers. Accordingly, the failure to warn Schwartz constituted post-
discharge tortious conduct, actionable under the FTCA. Schwartz, 230 F. Supp. at 540.
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Thornwell's claim fell within the third category, in that he alleg-
ed an intentional tort in the in-service drug experimentation program
and negligence in the post-discharge failure to provide follow-up
medical care.'" The court held that although the two acts were related,
the post-discharge negligence was wholly separate from the intentional,
in-service tort, and was therefore actionable.' Moreover, the court
noted that recovery for post-discharge tortious conduct was fully con-
sonant with the rationale underlying the Feres doctrine. 2 '
The lower courts are in disagreement, however, as to whether
the Thornwell analysis governs claims brought by atomic veterans
based on a post-discharge failure to warn theory. Although irradiated
veterans consistently allege intentional, in-service exposure and post-
discharge negligent omissions, pursuant to the Thornwell model, courts
are reluctant to recognize failure to warn as a separate, actionable
tort.'6 Instead, the lower courts have generally concluded that the
plaintiffs' pre-discharge and post-discharge allegations together con-
stitute one "continuing tort" arising out of the in-service exposure
to radiation, and therefore are barred by Feres"'
The "continuing tort" theory was first enunciated in Kelly v.
United States.2 In Kelly, claims were brought against the United
States for deliberate in-service exposure to radiation and negligent
concealment of the dangers posed by radiation exposure after the
plaintiff's discharge from the military.'" The court concluded that the
duty to warn Kelly arose at the time of his exposure and therefore
the government's subsequent failure to warn him about the adverse
effects of radiation exposure was merely "a continuation of the original
wrong."'30 As such, it was not an independent, actionable tort.'3' Di-
123. Thornwell, 471 F. Supp. at 351.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 350. Initially, the court noted that the maintenance of suits based
on post-discharge injuries would not adversely affect military discipline since the unique
relationship of the soldier to his superiors ceases once the service member attains
civilian status. Id. Moreover, the court noted that the "distinctively federal relation-
ship" between the government and members of the armed forces is completely vitiated
by an individual's change to civilian status. Id. Finally, the court acknowledged that
the possibility of "no fault" recovery through the Veterans' Administration is more
remote when the claimant was injured after discharge. Id.
126. See, e.g., Laswell, 683 F.2d 261; Sheehan v. United States, 542 F. Supp.
18 (S.D. Miss. 1982); Gaspard v. United States, 544 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. La. 1982).
127. See, e.g., Laswell, 683 F.2d at 267; Sheehan, 542 F. Supp. at 21; Gaspard,
544 F. Supp. at 58.
128. 512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
129. Id. at 358.
130. Id. at 361.
131. Id.
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rectly contrary to the rationale applied in Thornwell, the court reason-
ed that the distinction between Kelly's negligence and intentional tort
claims was an "artificial one" and labelled the post-discharge conceal-
ment claim a mere "reformulation of a complaint for in-service
negligence." ' Moreover, the court found that barring Kelly's post-
service negligence claim was compelled by Feres.33 The rationale set
forth in Kelly has since become the basis for denying the vast majority
of atomic veterans' post-discharge negligence claims."
A few courts have, however, recognized that veterans' post-
discharge failure to warn allegations might constitute actionable
claims.'" Persuaded by Thornwell analysis, these courts have held that
if the plaintiff can establish post-discharge governmental concealment,
Feres immunity will not attach.'36 As the courts have acknowledged,
however, establishing a cause of action based on post-service
negligence will involve difficult issues of proof." Accordingly, the post-
discharge failure to warn theory, like other theories employed, affords
atomic veterans little hope of judicial relief. The prospects of obtain-
ing adequate administrative relief are similarly remote.
The Veterans' Benefits Act
Compensation for military service-related injuries is normally
sought under the provisions of the Veterans' Benefits Act. 3 ' The
132. Id.
133. Id. The court reasoned that military decision-making might be inhibited
by the duty to reveal the details and risks involved in military operations. Id.
134. See, e.g., Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104, 1108 (3d Cir. 1984) (du-
ty to warn originated when exposure occurred and merely continued after discharge;
recovery barred by Feres); Laswell, 683 F.2d at 267 (Feres controlling; allegations con-
stituted "continuing tort"); Gaspard, 544 F. Supp. at 58 (Feres cannot be circumvented
by what is in reality a claim of continuing neglect); Sheehan, 542 F. Supp. at 21 (allega-
tions together state a "continuing tort" of the sort barred by Feres). See also Foun-
tain, 533 F. Supp. at 700 (since act which gave rise to duty to disclose not actionable,
subsequent omissions also within scope of Feres).
135. See Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016, 1025 (9th Cir.), cert dis-
missed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985); Cole v. United States, 755 F.2d 873, 880 (11th Cir. 1985);
Broudy, 661 F.2d at 128; Seveney v. United States Gov't., Dept. of Navy, 550 F. Supp.
653, 660 (D.R.I. 1982); Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318, 326 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
136. See, e.g., Broudy, 661 F.2d at 128, 129 (if plaintiff could prove an indepen-
dent, post-service tort, by showing that the government learned of the dangers of
radiation exposure after plaintiffs decedent left the service, claim would be actionable
under the FTCA).
137. See Seveney, 550 F. Supp. at 661 ("plaintiffs might have such rigorous hurdles
to overcome as to duty, proximate cause, damages and the like that the game might
not be worth the proverbial candle").
138. See 38 U.S.C. SS 301-362 (1982).
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Veterans' Administration (VA) will only award compensation, however,
for those personal injuries or diseases which are "connected to serv-
ice."'39 The claimant must establish service connection, either by
demonstrating that his disability is of a type presumed to be service-
related under VA regulations, or by "affirmatively showing" that the
inception or aggravation of his illness occurred coincident with military
service.' 0
Claimants seeking relief for radiation-induced injuries have been
unable to benefit from VA presumptions regarding service connec-
tion. Although the VA presumes service connection for certain chronic
diseases,' the diseases must manifest themselves within one year from
the service member's discharge for the presumption to apply.' Since
the cellular damage caused by radiation exposure generally has a
latency period of more than one year," the VA presumptions regard-
ing service connection have been of no avail to atomic veterans.
Atomic veterans have been equally unsuccessful in "affirmatively
showing" a causal connection between their illnesses and the atomic-
testing prograni. Causation has been difficult to prove because of the
evidentiary void involved in these cases.' Moreover, available medical
139. 38 U.S.C. SS 310, 331 (1982) (basic entitlement provisions for injuries
resulting from activities during war and peacetime, respectively). See also 38 C.F.R.
SS 3.301-.305 (1984).
140. 38 C.F.R. S 3.303 (1984).
141. 38 U.S.C. SS 301, 312 (1982). Chronic diseases currently given presump-
tive status are listed at 38 C.F.R. S 3.309(a) (1984).
142. 38 C.F.R. S 3.307(a)(3) (1984).
143. See Note, Tort Actions for Cancer: Deterrence Compensation, and
Environmental Carcinogenesis, 90 YALE L.J. 840 (1981) (cancer symptoms generally
latent for many years after exposure to carcinogens).
144. Initially, the claimant is often unable to produce evidence establishing the
level of radiation to which he or she was exposed because most of the participants
in the atomic-testing program were not issued film badges to record their exposure
to radiation. Moreover, the film badges which were issued did not provide a complete
measure of radiation exposure, since they were not capable of recording inhaled or
ingested doses of radiation. Furthermore, the accuracy of the readings taken is ques-
tionable because the film badges were often shielded during the detonation and were
worn for only limited periods during and after each detonation. See Veterans' Dioxin
and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, S 2(9), 98
Stat. 2725, 2726 (1984) (requiring Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to prescribe
guidelines for the adjudication of claims based on exposure to radiation or Agent
Orange). See also Note, supra note 2, at 949-51. New VA regulations do provide however,
that the possible inaccuracy of the dosimetry measurements will be considered in the
adjudication of claims. See 38 C.F.R. S 3.311b(e)(1) (1985).
Claimants also have had difficulty establishing their attendance at a nuclear
blast. Because the government failed to maintain a central depository for radiation
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data on the relationship between low-level radiation and cancer is not
sufficiently dispositive.'45 Not surprisingly, therefore, the VA has re-
jected the overwhelming majority of claims filed for radiation injuries
arising from the nuclear-testing program. 4 '
Atomic veterans' claims for relief have therefore been effectively
thwarted by both administrative and judicial impediments. In light
of the veterans' inability to sue either the United States or govern-
ment officials because of the broadly-based Feres doctrine, or to
recover adequate compensation under the veterans' benefits scheme,
suits brought against private contractors were presumably the
dosimetry records, many records were lost. Moreover, in 1973, millions of military
personnel records were destroyed by a fire in a government building. See Note, supra
note 2, at 956-57. Recent VA regulations do, however, create a presumption in favor
of the claimant when the veteran's presence or absence at a nuclear test site cannot
be established by the Department of Defense. See 38 C.F.R. S 3.311b(a)(4)(i) (1985).
The new VA regulations, found at 38 C.F.R. S 3.102, 3.311b (1985), were pro-
mulgated pursuant to the Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Stan-
dards Act. See Pub. L. No. 98-542, S 5, 98 Stat. 2725, 2727-29 (1984). Although the
Act was intended to ensure compensation for veterans exposed to ionizing radiation,
critics have charged that the new VA guidelines and adjudication procedures fall short
of this goal. See Atomic Veterans Relief Act of 1985: Hearings on H.R. 1613 Before the
Subcomm. on Compensation, Pension, and Insurance of the House Comm. on Veterans
Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 1985 Hearings]. As such,
new legislation has recently been introduced to remedy the inadequacies of the VA
regulations, by creating a presumption of service connection for radiation-related ill-
nesses. See S. 707, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 1613, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
145. Congress has recently responded to the medical and scientific uncertainty
in this area by requiring the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to consider the
feasibility of conducting an epidemiological study of the effects of radiation on veterans
who participated in the nuclear-testing program. See Veterans' Health Care Amend-
ments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-160, S 601, 97 Stat. 993, 1006-09 (1983). In addition, Con-
gress has authorized the development of radioepidemiological tables showing the pro-
babilities of causation between various types of cancers and exposure to radiation.
See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, S 7(b), 96 Stat. 2049, 2060 (1983). These studies
may take a great deal of time to complete, however. In the interim, the lack of available
information specifically related to radiation exposure during the atomic-testing pro-
gram can only work to the veterans' disadvantage. As recently noted by the House
Committee on Veterans' Affairs, "Although current evidence indicates that some
veterans exposed to ionizing radiation are experiencing serious medical problems,
available data falls far short of meeting the test that ... these disabilities are related
to military service." H.R. REP. No. 592, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1984). Interestingly,
this conclusion was reached notwithstanding the Committee's awareness that a study
conducted by the Center for Disease Control indicated an increased frequency of
leukemia and bone marrow disease in troops present at a 1957 nuclear blast called
"Smokey." Id. at 8.
146. 1985 Hearings, supra note 144, at 12 (99.5% of all claims for radiation-
related diseases have been rejected by the VA).
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veterans' last avenue of relief. By foreclosing this source of recovery,
the 1985 Defense Authorization Act has effectively left the atomic
veterans remediless.
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion." ' 7 The constitutionality of section 1631 of the 1985 Department
of Defense Authorization Act, under the fifth amendment, will
therefore depend on a two-part analysis. First, it must be determined
whether atomic veterans' claims against private contractors involved
in the atomic-testing program constitute constitutionally-protected pro-
perty interests. Secondly, it must be decided whether section 1631's
deprivation of these interests meets constitutional standards.
The Takings Issue
While there is "no set formula" for determining whether govern-
ment regulation is so extensive as to amount to a "taking" of private
property for which compensation must be paid,"8 there are two prere-
quisites for establishing a violation of the fifth amendment takings
clause. As pertinent to section 1631 and its impact on atomic veterans'
suits, it must initially be shown that the veterans' causes of action
are a constitutionally-protected species of "property" under the fifth
amendment.'49 Secondly, it must be established that section 1631, by
extinguishing veterans' pending and future claims against atomic-
testing contractors, effectuated a "taking" for which just compensa-
tion is due."5
The Supreme Court has uniformly recognized that a cause of
action is a constitutionally-protected property interest."5 ' As early as
1881, the Court acknowledged that a vested right of action is property
in the same sense in which tangible things are property and is equal-
147. U.S. CONST. amend V.
148. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
149. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (right to
seek redress for employment discrimination is property right); Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277 (1980) (state tort claim is species of property); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (right to have trustee answer for negligence
is protected property right).
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ly protected against arbitrary interference. 2 This view was most
recently affirmed by the Court in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.'"
In Logan, an Illinois statute prohibited employment discrimination
against the physically handicapped." Pursuant to the statute, a claim-
ant alleging unlawful conduct had to first bring his charge before
a state commission.'55 The commission then had 120 days within which
to convene a fact-finding conference to investigate the claim and
facilitate negotiations between the parties.'M Logan filed a charge with
the commission, alleging unlawful termination of employment, but the
commission inadvertently failed to schedule a fact-finding conference
until after the expiration of the 120-day statutory period.' 57 Accor-
dingly, the issue presented was whether Logan's constitutional rights
would be violated if the commission's error was allowed to extinguish
his cause of action.T
The Court concluded that Logan's cause of action was a constitu-
tionally protected property right,5 9 relying on its earlier decision in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.' In Mullane, a state
law provided for the binding and conclusive judicial settlement of com-
mon trust fund accounts by fiduciaries, upon notice through newspaper
publication.'' The Mullane Court found that the law would unconstitu-
tionally deprive the trust fund beneficiaries of property, by ex-
tinguishing their rights to have the trustee answer for negligent or
152. Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882). The common law concept
of property was embodied in the Blackstonian theory that property required some
"external thing" to serve as the object of property rights. Vandeveld, The Property
oJ the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF
ALO L. REv. 325, 331 (1980). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
this notion gave way to a dephysicalized concept of property which viewed property
not as a right over "things," but as a set of legal relations such as rights, powers,
privileges, and immunities. See id. at 333-66. Consonant with this view, many types
of intangible property are now recognized as deserving constitutional protection. See,
e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984) (trade secrets); Matthews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (social security benefits); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1974) (public education); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Vail
v. Bd. of Educ. of Paris Union School Dist. No. 95, 706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983), affd,
466 U.S. 377 (1984) (public employment).
153. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
154. Id. at 424.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 426.
158. Id. at 426-27.
159. Id. at 428-31.
160. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
161. Id. at 308-09.
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illegal impairment of the beneficiaries' interests. ' Accordingly, the
Logan Court reasoned that there was no meaningful distinction be-
tween the "right to have the trustee answer" in Mullane and Logan's
right to redress discrimination; both causes of action were protected
forms of property.'63
Not all causes of action are recognized as constitutionally pro-
tected property rights, however. Only accrued causes of action are
forms of property; unaccrued causes of action are not.'64 As such,
veterans, whose cause of action against atomic-testing contractors
have accrued under state tort laws, possess vested property rights
which cannot be taken without just compensation.
While the recognition of causes of action as "property" has
primarily been in the due process context, it has recently been
acknowledged that the extinguishment of causes of action may give
rise to "takings" claims. In Dames & Moore v. Regan,'5 the Supreme
Court recognized that the President's suspension of American
creditors' claims against the Iranian government, pursuant to a hostage
release agreement, might effect a "takings" claim against the United
States.'" Similarly, in 1982, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Warsaw
Convention limitations on liability arising out of airline crashes, if ap-
plicable, might precipitate a taking of the plaintiffs' wrongful death
actions.' 7 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had a right, under
state law, to recover damages for the wrongful death of their
decedents and accordingly their claims for compensation were prop-
erty interests which could not be unreasonably impaired by legislative
provisions without just compensation.' 8
162. Id. at 313.
163. Logan, 455 U.S. at 429.
164. Pitts v. Unarco Indus., 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 509
(1983). This distinction is perhaps best explained by the theory that the cause of ac-
tion itself is not the "property" interest at issue. Instead, the set of legitimate expec-
tations upon which the cause of action is based is the underlying property interest.
See Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the
"Government-as-Monopolist" Theory of the Due Process Clause, 31 EMORY L.J. 491, 510
(1982). See also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("It is the purpose
of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely
in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined."). In addition,
expectations giving rise to property interests must be more than merely abstract or
unilateral. Id. at 577. Instead, to be "legitimate," they must be based on positive legal
sources, such as existing state and common laws. Id.
165. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
166. Id. at 690-91.
167. In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
168. Id. at 1312.
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Although an analysis of whether unreasonable impairment has
occurred is essentially an "ad hoc, factual" inquiry,"9 the Supreme
Court has identified several factors to be considered when determin-
ing whether governmental action has gone beyond mere "regulation"
so as to effect a "taking." The first factor is the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant, including the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with reasonable expectations.'7" A second con-
sideration is the character of the governmental action. 7' Applying
these factors, a "taking" will be found if the regulation has an unduly
harsh impact upon the owner's use of his property or if the regula-
tion is not reasonably necessary to effectuate substantial public goals.'
In determining the economic impact of a given regulation, courts
focus on the particular "thing" injuriously affected and ask what pro-
portion of its value is destroyed by the measure in question. 7' If the
proportion is so large as to approach totality, a taking has occurred;
otherwise it has not.'74 As such, mere diminution in property value,
although substantial, has been insufficient to sustain a takings claim.'7 '
Similarly, regulations depriving the property owner of only the most
profitable use of his property interests have been upheld against tak-
ings challenges.' 6 On the other hand, governmental actions which so
substantially interfere with property rights as to render the property
worthless or useless, have been held to have effectuated a taking.'77
Section 1631 of the 1985 Defense Authorization Act, as it affects
veterans' claims against atomic-testing contractors, is of this latter
variety. Section 1631 does more than merely diminish the value of
169. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 127. The Penn Central Court also noted that a "taking" will more
readily be found when a physical invasion of the owner's property by the government
has occurred. Id. at 124. Since a cause of action is a dephysicalized form of property
which cannot logically be "physically invaded," the physical interference factor is not
pertinent to the discussion of whether section 1631 effectuated a taking of veterans'
vested causes of action.
173. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967).
174. Id.
175. Haddacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (871/2% diminution in value
insufficient).
176. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (no taking where regulation merely
prohibited plaintiffs from selling their property).
177. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
[Vol. 20
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the irradiated veterans' property interests, by, for example, placing
a limit on the amount of their recovery. Instead, by converting the
veterans' claims into suits against the government, thereby invoking
the Feres bar to recovery, section 1631 effectively renders the
veterans' causes of action worthless. As such, it extinguishes the
veterans' expectations, grounded in state tort laws, of obtaining com-
pensation for their radiation-induced injuries. Accordingly, section 1631
may be characterized as the type of regulation which has an impact
so "unduly harsh" as to effectuate a taking."8
In addition to measuring a regulation's impact on property in-
terests, the character of the governmental action must also be ex-
amined, in determining whether a "taking" has occurred. To withstand
a takings challenge, the regulation must be reasonably necessary to
effectuate legitimate public goals."7 9 The goals advanced by section
1631 are two-fold. First, section 1631 was intended to shield the in-
stitutions that performed services vital to national security from
liability arising out of their participation in the atomic-weapons testing
program.' s° Section 1631 was not needed, however, to effectuate this
goal, because the atomic-testing contractors were already shielded from
liability by indemnity agreements with the government. 8' Section
1631's second goal was to ensure that uniform remedies would be pro-
vided, where a connection between the nuclear testing program and
the harm alleged was established.'82 Section 1631 similarly fails to ef-
fectuate its second ,goal, because it ensures only that remedies will
be uniformly non-existent.
In summary, section 1631 completely abrogates atomic veterans'
claims for injuries arising out of the atomic-testing program, thereby
rendering the veterans' constitutionally-protected property interests
useless. Moreover, section 1631 fails to advance legitimate public goals.
178. But see In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation,
616 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Cal. 1985). In this case, a consolidation of forty-three actions
brought by irradiated veterans against atomic-testing contractors, the court held that
section 1631 did not effect a taking of the veterans' claims. Id. at 770. The court reasoned
that section 1631 does not abrogate the veterans' claims but merely "substitute[s] the
remedy against the government under the FTCA for any cause of action against the
contractors arising under state law." Id. at 765-66, 770. That such a conclusion was
reached notwithstanding the court's recognition that Feres immunity would attach to
FTCA actions is indeed remarkable.
179. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
180. S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 374 (1984).
181. Id. at 375-76.
182. Id. at 377.
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As such, section 1631 has effectuated a "taking" of the veterans' causes
of action, for which compensation in the form of damages must be paid.
Substantive Due Process Challenge
Under substantive due process analysis, economic legislation such
as section 1631 carries a strong presumption of constitutionality.'8 3
This presumption can be overcome only by a clear showing of arbitrari-
ness or irrationality. '84 Under this highly deferential, "minimal
scrutiny" standard,' legislation such as section 1631 will be upheld
against due process challenges unless it can be established that the
legislation is not rationally related to legitimate governmental objec-
tives.86
A substantive due process model for analyzing legislation which
limits liability in the area of atomic energy was set forth by the
Supreme Court in 1978, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group.18 In Duke Power, citizen groups and other individuals challenged
the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act, which limits liability
for nuclear accidents resulting from the operation of private nuclear
power plants." In determining whether the Act contravened the right
to due process guaranteed by the fifth amendment, the Court noted
that the Act, as a legislative balancing of economic interests, carried
183. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 presumed to be constitutional); Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (Kansas statute making it unlawful to engage in "debt adjusting"
carried presumption of constitutionality; Court refused to "sit as a superlegislature
to weight the wisdom of legislation").
Social or economic regulations which impinge upon "fundamental rights," however,
are not afforded a presumption of constitutionality. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314,
331 (1981). Instead, if this type of legislation is to withstand judicial scrutiny, a "com-
pelling" governmental interest must be shown. Holman v. Hilton, 542 F. Supp. 913,
920 (D.N.J. 1982), affd, 712 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1983). Although the Supreme Court has
recognized that the right of access to the courts is a "fundamental constitutional right,"
right of access to the judiciary is not considered a "fundamental right" for due pro-
cess purposes. Id. at 919-20. In fact, "fundamental rights" in the due process and equal
protection contexts have primarily been limited to the right to privacy and the related
right to procreate. See. e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983) (woman's right to terminate pregnancy considered a "fun-
damental right"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman's right of privacy and
autonomy to make abortion decision deemed a fundamental right).
184. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 331-32.
185. Holman, 542 F. Supp. at 920. See also Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 729-732 (discus-
sion of the evolution of the "minimal scrutiny" test).
186. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 85 (1978).
187. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
188. Id. at 68.
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a presumption of constitutionality.'" As such, the Act would be upheld
absent clear proof of arbitrariness or irrationality. 9 '
Under this "rational basis" standard, the Court initially reviewed
the intended purposes of the Price-Anderson Act. 9 ' The Act's objec-
tives were two-fold. First, the law was intended to stimulate the in-
volvement of the private sector in the development of atomic energy,
by protecting investors from the risks of potentially vast liability.'92
Secondly, the Act was designed to protect the public, by ensuring
prompt and equitable compensation in the event of a nuclear disaster. 3
After reviewing the intended purposes of the Price-Anderson Act,
the Court next considered whether the provisions of the Act bore
a rational relationship to the Act's dual objectives. '94 The Court in-
itially concluded that the law effectively protected the interests of
private enterprise, by placing a statutory ceiling on liability.1 95
Secondly, the Act was considered an effective means of protecting
public interests because it provided for adequate and certain compen-
sation without proof of fault.' Hence, the Court concluded that the
Act was rationally related to legitimate public goals and therefore
comported with due process requirements. 97
189. Id. at 84-85.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 65.
192. Id. at 65, 84. Congress initially intended that the development of nuclear
power would be monopolized by the government. Id. at 64. It was later determined,
however, that the national interest would be best served if the private sector became
involved in atomic energy development, under a program of federal regulation and
licensing. Id. Although incentives were offered to encourage investment, the risk of
potentially vast liability in the event of a nuclear accident was a major impediment
to private industry involvement. Id. at 65. Finally, spokesmen for the private sector
informed Congress that they would be forced to totally withdraw from the atomic
energy field if their liability was not limited by legislation. Id. Congress responded
by passing the Price-Anderson Act. Id.
193. Id. at 65, 84.
194. Id. at 64-68.
195. Id. at 65-68. Under the statutory scheme, the private nuclear industry
was to take out the maximum amount of public liability insurance, $60 million. If
damages from a nuclear incident exceeded $60 million, the government would indem-
nify the private investors up to $500 million. Thus, the actual ceiling on liability from
a single nuclear accident was $560 million. If damages exceeded this amount, Con-
gress agreed to take "whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to pro-
tect the public from the consequences of a disaster of such magnitude." Id. at 65-68.
196. Id. at 66-67. Persons indemnified under the Act were required to waive
all legal defenses in the event of a nuclear accident. Id.
197. Id. at 85.
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The constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act was reinforced
by the Court's finding that the Act provided a reasonably just
substitute for the state and common law remedies it abrogated.190 In
fact, recovery under the Act would be more certain and efficient
because the Act provided a secure source of funds 1"' as well as a firm
basis for legal liability."' ° As such, the Duke Power Court held that
the legislation sufficiently withstood due process challenges. 1
Under the Duke Power model, a substantive due process analysis
of section 1631 of the 1985 Defense Authorization Act must include
the examination of three factors. First, the intended goals of the
legislation must be outlined. Secondly, it must be determined whether
the provisions of section 1631 bear a rational relationship to the stated
objectives. Finally, it must be decided whether the new law provides
a fair and reasonable substitute for the remedies it replaces.
Section 1631 of the 1985 Defense Authorization Act has dual
goals, both closely parallel to the legislative objectives advanced in
Duke Power.2 ' First, section 1631 was intended to protect private in-
stitutions from liability arising out of their participation in the atomic-
weapons testing program.0 3 Congress felt that such protection was
duly warranted on the grounds that the contractors merely function-
ed as government instrumentalities in the testing program and pro-
vided services vital to the development of atomic energy for military
purposes.0 4 Section 1631's second objective was to provide persons
injured as the result of the atomic-testing program with uniform
remedies." 5
Section 1631 fails to bear a rational relationship to either of these
stated goals. First, although section 1631's conversion of suits against
atomic-testing contractors into claims against the government would
seemingly protect the contractors from tort liability, such refuge was
not warranted because the contractors were already fully indemnified
by the government under the terms of their contracts.' As such, even
198. Id. at 89.
199. Id. at 90. Moreover, the Court noted that the Act's aggregate level of
compensation, $560 million, would generally exceed the amount recoverable in private
litigation. Id. at 94.
200. Id. at 90. The Act provided for strict liability. Id. at 66-67.
201. Id. at 85.
202. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
203. See S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 374-75. See aLso supra notes 24-32
and accompanying text.
204. See S. REP. No. 500, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 374-75.
205. Id. at 377.
206. Id. at 376.
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in the absence of section 1631's purportedly "protective" cloak, the
contractors would be completely reimbursed for any liability arising
out of their participation in the atomic-testing program, including the
costs of litigation."°7 Section 1631 also fails to bear a rational relation
to its second goal, that injured claimants be afforded uniform remedies.
Section 1631's consolidation of atomic-testing cases under the FTCA
will ensure only that judgments are uniform.0 8 Since Feres implica-
tions will attach to section 1631 FTCA actions, no remedies will
result."9
Additionally, section 1631 fails to provide a just and reasonable
substitute for the state and common law tort remedies it replaces.
While FTCA claims against the federal government are the purported
"reasonable substitute," such claims will be uniformly barred by the
Feres doctrine.210 Alternative sources of judicial and administrative
relief will be similarly unavailable."' Accordingly, in denying atomic
veterans any means of redress, section 1631 is antithetical to the fun-
damental notions of due process 2 and is therefore unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
A significant number of the armed service members who were
exposed to radiation during their forced participation in the United
States atomic-testing program now suffer from various types of
cancers. The atomic veterans have been unable to recover for their
radiation-induced injuries, however, due largely to a Supreme Court
ruling known as the Feres doctrine, which created intramilitary im-
munity for incident-to-service negligence. The Feres doctrine has not
only served as the basis for dismissing veterans' negligence claims
against the United States, but has been uniformly judicially extended
so as to bar service members' intentional tort claims, constitutional
claims, claims brought against individual military officers, and claims
based on an independent, post-discharge tort theory. Administrative
relief under the Veterans' Benefits Act has been equally lacking. In
a final attempt at gaining redress, atomic veterans recently began
suing private contractors who participated in the atomic-testing
program.
207. Id. at 375.
208. See supra text accompanying note 33.
209. See supra notes 36-73 and accompanying text.
210. Id.
211. See supra notes 74-146 and accompanying text.
212. See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.").
1986]
Malloy: 1985 Department of Defense Authorization Act:  Leaving Atomic Vet
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1986
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
In response to the veterans' efforts to obtain relief, Congress
enacted the 1985 Department of Defense Authorization Act. Section
1631 of the Act converts all pending and future claims brought against
atomic-testing contractors into suits against the federal government,
thereby invoking the Feres bar to recovery. In foreclosing this final
avenue of redress, Congress has effectively rendered the atomic
veteran remediless.
Section 1631, as the legislature's response to the plight of ir-
radiated veterans, is not only disingenuous but is disheartening.
Moreover, section 1631 is constitutionally objectionable. First, by ex-
tinguishing veterans' accrued causes of action, in which there is a
constitutionally-protected property right, section 1631 effects a "tak-
ing" under the fifth amendment for which just compensation in the
form of monetary damages is due. More importantly, the new law
bears no rational relationship to its intended goals, and therefore fails
to comport with the right of due process guaranteed by the fifth
amendment. Accordingly, section 1631 of the 1985 Department of
Defense Authorization Act is constitutionally defective and should
therefore be repealed.
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